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Abstract 
 
 
The lack of convergence across Italian Regions has been widely cited as an 
incontrovertible proof of failure of Cohesion policy. This paper aims to provide a 
twofold contribution to the debate on the effectiveness of Cohesion policies in Italy. 
Firstly, we  provide an up-to-date view of convergence across Italian regions by focussing 
on the period covered by regional development policies carried out by European 
Community. The analysis reveals that poorer regions in Italy have indeed caught up with 
the richer regions over the period 1994-2004 and much of this convergence process has 
occurred towards region-specific steady states. Secondly, we consider Structural Funds as 
a conditioning variable in the convergence equation by using recently available data on 
expenditure implemented during the Second and the Third Planning Period. Our panel 
estimates point to a positive and significant impact of the Structural Funds on regional 
convergence in Italy over the period 1994-2004. When the Structural Funds are 
considered individually we find that the expenditure allocated by ERDF has medium 
term positive and significant returns while support to agriculture has short-term positive 
effects on growth which wane quickly. Finally, our results cast some doubt both on the 
(i) distributive efficiency of resources allocated by ESF and (ii) on the effectiveness of the 
intervention policies in support to education, Human capital and employment.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Single European Act ascribes to the Cohesion Policy the aim at 
achieving “greater economic and social cohesion and reducing disparities 
within the European Union (EU, 1997)”. The need for European 
Regional development policies rely upon the view that market 
mechanisms cannot induce economic convergence but rather exacerbate 
existing inequalities. Accordingly, European regional support has grown 
in parallel with European integration. As a matter of fact, originally 
European Union was constituted by very homogeneous member states; 
the only exception was represented by Southern Italian Regions: in order 
to help these historically lagging regions to fill the gap with the rest of 
EU, a special European support was provided in form of dispensations 
to the general regulation. As the number of member states increased also 
territorial disparities among different parts of EU increased and new 
dispensations were addressed in support to weaker regions. The decision 
to implement the Single Market further boosts European Regional 
development policies and a radical reform, implemented in 19891, assigns 
to regional policy the precious competence to cushion the burdens of 
profound restructuring in the weaker economies following the creation 
of the Single Market. Since then, Cohesion support has become a 
precondition for European Integration. So far, two Programming 
Periods have been implemented (1989-93 and 1994-99) and a third one 
(2000-2006) is finishing straight. With the Cohesion Policies, which 
include the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund2, the European 
Community finances programs in regions that lag behind in income per 
capita, over-rely on industries in decline, or face high unemployment 
rates. The funding strategy aims “to support those actions that are most 
likely to contribute to the reduction of the economic, social and 
territorial disparities” (European Commission, 2001) and mainly translate 
into programs intent to enhance infrastructure, restructure industries or 
modernise education. The financial resources involved are also relevant; 
after the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Cohesion Policy 
represents the second largest policy area in the EU budget: for instance, 
                                                 
1 See European Commission (1991) , (1994) 
2 The Cohesion Fund is an additional financing instrument in favour of 
member states with a per capita income of less than 90% of the Union average; 
this are Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.  
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for period 2000-2006 this amounts to more than 40% of the EU budget 
and 0.35% of EU GDP.  
Unfortunately, despite the amount of resources allocated over 
the three Planning Periods, striking regional economic and social 
imbalances persist within European Union. If member states are getting 
closer, most of lagging regions within countries are still characterised by 
unacceptable levels of social and economic indicators. The performance 
of Southern Italian regions has often been cited as an emblematic 
example. Table 1 presents some economic and social indicators for the 
Italian regions. Firstly we observe that, from 1996 to 2001, Southern 
regions still exhibit level of per capita income well below the European 
average (from 59% for Calabria to 90% for Abruzzo). This confirms 
how the Italian Mezzogiorno is also representative of an other worrying 
signal: the lack of upward mobility of assisted regions. In fact, only 
Abruzzo in Southern Italy has managed to come out of Objective 1 at 
the end of 1997 while Molise is being phased out and will lose its 
support at the end of 2006. Moreover, differently from Northern 
regions, the ranking (in terms of per capita GDP) among Southern 
regions keeps unchanged from 1996 to 2001. In 2002, the structure of 
such economies still presents an higher share of employed in Agriculture 
(10% on average) than other regions (4% on average). During the same 
year, while Northern regions exhibit on average an unemployment rate 
around 5%, values for Southern regions present a higher dispersion, 
ranking from 6% for Abruzzo to 25% in Calabria. Significant territorial 
disparities are also evident with regards to other indicators of market 
labour. On average, long period unemployment rate is around 36% in 
Northern regions compared with 63% in the South, female 
unemployment rate are well above 20% in the Southern regions (and 
around 14% in the others). A more worrying signal comes from young 
unemployment rates: on average Northern regions record a rate around 
14% while the same indicator in the South is around 44%3. Finally, 
despite such relevant economic and social territorial disparities, it is 
worthwhile to notice that, in 2002, regions only slightly differ with 
respect to the level of education: on average the percentage of 
population with low levels of education is about 59% in the South and 
54% in the North.  
                                                 
3 Among regions, Calabria exhibits the worse performance for most these 
indicators.  
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Given the amount of financial resources involved and the 
persistence of territorial disparities, it is natural to raise the question on 
whether European Cohesion policies are effective in reducing regional 
welfare differences. On the whole, the Cohesion Policy has been 
criticised on very different grounds. For example, Boldrin and Canova 
(2001) argue that the cohesion support reveals a somehow inconsistent 
position by the European Community (henceforth EC) on labour 
mobility. From one hand, the EC claims that, even if European 
integration, via agglomeration effects, could lead to divergence between 
per capita regional income, this would not be a problem if labour was 
free to move from poor to rich regions4. From one other hand, by 
allocating cohesion support to compensate immobile workers living in 
the poor regions, however, the EC is implicitly accepting that labour 
should be immobile. Other authors5 cast some doubts on the alleged 
redistributive efficiency of Cohesion Policy. In fact, although poor 
regions receive relatively much support, rich regions also receive 
cohesion support. The result is that, at a national level, each member 
state receives at least some financial resources! This would tend to 
mitigate the redistributive impact of cohesion policy. As Ederveen et 
others (2003) argue, a significant part of cohesion support is not 
“territorial” but “thematic” and accordingly, funding is not necessary 
allocated to the poorest regions. Moreover, not only all regions appear to 
be successful in drawing down at least some funds but this process is 
dominated by a sort of inertia: once a region has received funds in the 
past is more likely to receive funds in the future.  
Three different types of research6 dominate the empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy: (i) case studies of 
individual or small groups of projects, (ii) simulations of the macro 
economic impact with large computable general equilibrium models and 
(iii) econometric analyses. In general, no consistent picture of the impact 
of cohesion policies emerges from this empirical literature. As Ederveen 
at others (2003) observe, model simulations tend to yield more positive 
conclusions than others. In model simulations cohesion policy directly 
translates into productive public capital, whereas econometric studies 
implicitly take into account other factors that may hamper the 
                                                 
4 See also Puga (2002) and Cuadrado-Roura (2001) 
5 See De la Fuente and Doménech (2001) among others 
6 For a comprehensive review of case studies, simulation models and 
econometric estimates, see Ederveen et al. (2003).    
 5 
effectiveness of cohesion policy. The general conclusion is that, while 
the findings of model simulations are to be interpreted as the potential 
impact, the findings of econometric studies represent the actual impact. 
As compared with the increasing number of empirical studies carried out 
on the European regions, the empirical literature focussing on the 
effectiveness of Cohesion Policy on Italian regions is relatively scarce 
and is mostly represented by studies on Objective 1 regions7.  
Although econometric studies have largely focussed on the 
debate of convergence in the EU, the role of cohesion policies in 
affecting convergence is still a vexed question8: some econometric 
analyses find that the funds have a negligible or even a negative impact 
on convergence, while others observe a significant positive impact. 
Perhaps we should not be surprise to notice that, the most pessimist 
view coincides with the early studies focussing on the first Planning 
Period (1989-93)9. For instance,  Boldrin and Canova (2001) among 
others, conclude that regional and structural policies serve mostly a 
redistributive purpose and are unable in fostering economic growth. 
Indeed, in recent studies the most pessimistic view has slightly given 
space to a prudent optimism. Garcia Solanes and Maria-Dolores (2001), 
by assessing the impact of Structural Funds on EU regions during the 
programming periods 1989-93 and 1994-99 find that, the financial 
assistance provided by Structural Funds has a clearly positive impact on 
regional convergence. Moreover, only recent studies can boast of reliable 
disaggregated data on Regional commitments allocated by intervention 
strategy. Among the others, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), working 
on Objective 1 regions point out that, despite the concentration of 
resources in infrastructure, the returns to commitment on these axes are 
not significant while investment in education and human capital exhibits 
a positive effect. Differently, by considering the whole set of European 
regions, Garcia Solanes and Maria-Dolores (2001) conclude that the 
biggest impact on growth accrues from expenditure allocated to sustain 
and renew agriculture sector as well as investment in Infrastructure.  
                                                 
7 For instance, Percoco (2005), by using a supply-side model estimated with a 
panel of regional data over the period 1970-94, finds a high volatility in the level 
of growth rates induced by Structural Funds expenditure allocated in Objective 
1 regions over the period 1994-99. 
8 On this issue see also Cheshire and Magrini (2000) among others 
9 On potential diverging factors occurring during this period, see Cappelen, 
Castellaci, Fagerberg, Verspagen (2001) 
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The lack of convergence across Italian regions has often been 
interpreted as a strong evidence of failure for Cohesion policy. As we 
have already emphasised, most relevant empirical literature on this issue 
has focussed on the First Planning Period (1989-93) which has certainly 
represented the more hesitant phase in the evolution of Cohesion 
support. Moreover, the chronic delay in the expenditure that so heavily 
has characterised the performance of Structural Funds in Italy (under the 
First as much as the Second Planning Period), has ended up postponing 
the real impact of cohesion support on time. In this prospect, any 
empirical assessment of Structural Funds may be in a sense “premature”. 
In our work we aim to provide an up-to-date contribution to this 
“debate in progress” on the effectiveness of Cohesion policies in Italy by 
using a recently available data set on payments disaggregated by 
Structural Funds. In particular, once a correspondence between 
intervention strategy and financier Fund has been established, we wish to 
apply the analysis carried out on Structural Funds to assess which 
intervention strategy, if any, has had a positive impact on convergence 
across Italian regions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
evolution, the rationale, the strategy and the instruments which 
characterise the implementation of Cohesion Policies in Italy. In section 
3 we briefly review some theoretical foundations of regional convergence 
and we assess the convergence hypothesis in Italy for period 1980-2004. 
In section 4 we analyse empirically the impact of EU Structural Funds on 
convergence in Italy. In section 5  we conclude.  
 
 
2. Cohesion Policies in Italy: rationale, strategy and 
instruments 
 
The financial resources allocated by Cohesion Policies in Italy have 
steadily increased since the reform in 1989. Starting from a total amount 
equal to 0,3% of Italian GDP for period 1989-93, Italy was the second 
beneficiary (after Spain) over the period 1994-99 and takes up more than 
15% of total EU resources over the period running from 2000-610. Due 
to lacking available data at regional level for payments allocated over the 
period 1989-93, in what follows we will focus entirely on the Second and 
the Third Planning Program. The Cohesion Policies for Italy coincide 
                                                 
10 See European Commission (1999), (2000) 
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with Structural Funds11 which cover a variety of different programmes. 
They are: 
 
1. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) primarily 
finances investment in infrastructure and employment, initiatives of 
small-scale business; it should generate growth in capital stock, 
infrastructure, SME firms among others; 
 
2. The European Social Fund (ESF) is designed for vocational training 
and improvements in the education systems, it supports programs that 
aid the integration of the unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged groups 
in the labour market; it should generate mobility of labour, rising 
employment of young people and women, growth in educational 
attainment and an increase in R&D;  
 
3. The Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) is the oldest fund. Its origins date 
back to 1962 as a part of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). It 
supports farmers and finances programs for the development of rural 
areas;  it should generate growth in farming employment, productivity 
and income; 
 
4. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), 
established in 1994, is a special fund which aims at restructuring and 
modernising the fishing industry.  
 
We could roughly assign a correspondent strategy to each financier Fund 
according to the main item in its expenditure. In this way, for instance, 
we could identify ERDF with Investment in Infrastructure and Business 
support, ESF with support to formation of Human Capital, EAGGF 
and FIFG with general support to agriculture sector and fishing. This 
classification, far from being exhaustive, will help us to make up for 
lacking reliable detailed data on payments allocated to the relevant 
measures. Moreover, we also believe that, this classification could 
simplify the comparison among regions and Planning Periods.  
Structural Funds greatly differ in their financial relevance. The 
analysis of such differences gives a measure of the importance assigned 
                                                 
11 Consequently in the case of Italy we can use the term “Cohesion Policy” and 
“Structural Funds” as synonymous 
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to each intervention strategy, both across Planning Periods and within 
Funds. In line with other European countries, ERDF is the most 
important fund in Italy. As we can see from the last row reported on 
table 2-3, it covers the 67% of the total amount allocated over the 
Planning Period 2000-2006 (the 62% over 1994-99). On the opposite 
side the support to fishing by FIFG takes only 1% of total resources. If 
ERDF and FIFG keep a constant share across the two Planning Periods, 
this is not the case for other Funds. The expenditure allocated through 
ESF was only 12% during the Second Planning Period while it has more 
than doubled over period 2000-2006. This points out an important 
change occurred in the strategy pursued in support to human capital and 
employment between the two periods. A closer analysis highlights how 
this change has occurred to the disadvantage of the expenditure share 
allocated by EAGGF which indeed records a significant decrease from 
20% to 9% over the total planned.  
Structural Funds are meant to target different Objectives12. 
Each objective corresponds to a different subset of regions. The number 
of these Objectives has been progressively reduced over the three 
Planning Periods. With reference to the present institutional design, for 
the Planning Period 2000-2006 we have three Objectives. Objective 1 
helps lagging regions to catch up with the rest of Europe by providing 
basic infrastructure and encouraging business activity. Regions with a per 
capita GDP of less than 75% of the Community average qualify for this 
type of funding; in Italy, all the Southern regions proved to be eligible 
for Objective 1 over the period 1989-93. Since then, only Abruzzo has 
managed to come out of Objective 1 at the end of 1997 while Molise is 
being phased out and will lose its support at the end of 2006. Objective 1 
represents the core of Cohesion policy and accordingly takes up most of 
the financial resources. In Italy, it amounts to about 68% of total 
structural funding allocated over the period 2000-2006 (61% over the 
period 1994-99).  
Objective 2 helps the economic and social restructuring of 
regions dependent on industries in decline, agriculture or areas suffering 
from problems specific to urbanisation. In order to qualify for Objective 
2, industrial regions must have an unemployment rate above the 
Community average, a higher percentage of jobs in the industrial sector 
than the Community average, and a decline in the industrial employment. 
                                                 
12 A detailed classification of Italian regions according to Objectives and 
Structural Funds for periods 1994-99 and 2000-06 can be found in Appendix.  
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Moreover, regions must not be eligible for Objective 1 support. As we 
can see from Appendix, all Italian regions not included in Objective 1 
were actually eligible for Objective 2. Its expenditure share has increased 
from 8% during the Second Planning Period to 14% over the period 
2000-2006. Objective 3 aims to modernise education and increase 
employment. This type of funding is Community wide. Any region may 
qualify, provided that it does not receive Objective 1 funding. As 
confirmed in Appendix, all not-Objective 1 Italian regions provided to 
be eligible for Objective 3. Funding involved are equal to 14 % of total 
available for the actual Planning Period (6% over the period 1994-99). 
The remainder of the Structural Funds (around 4%) goes to the 
Community Initiatives (CI). These are programmes aimed to promote 
interregional co-operation in solving common problems. In particular: (i) 
INTERREG III supports cross border initiatives; (ii) URBAN II 
supports innovative strategies for the re-development of urban areas; (iii) 
LEADER + attempts to bring together parties in rural area in order to 
achieve sustainable development; (iv) EQUAL tries to remove inequality 
and discrimination on the labour market. 
The above description confirms that in Italy each region receives 
at least some financial support. This is a  well documented fact across all 
European countries and it has often been used to cast some doubts on 
the redistributive efficiency of Cohesion policy. According to some 
authors, Objective 2 and Objective 3 support would be questionable 
because distribute funds to relatively rich regions. This would mitigate 
redistribution because “only if funds are distributed from rich to poor 
the cohesion policy have the potential to help lagging regions to catch 
up”(see Ederveen e others, 2003). In order to assess to what extent the 
total of cohesion support is indeed redistributive in Italy, figure 1 
displays the relationship between the log of regional per capita GDP and 
the total amount of regional per capita support for period 1994-200413. 
The pattern detected confirms that cohesion policy exhibits some degree 
of redistributive efficiency: most of poor regions get more than rich 
regions in Italy.  
In what follows we will briefly analyse and compare how 
Structural Funds are allocated among different Objectives over the years 
1994-2004. In general, as we can see from tables 2, Objective 1 binds 
most resources by each Fund over the period 1994-99.  In more detail, 
                                                 
13 A similar pattern is detected when splitting the total period according to the 
two Planning Periods 
 10 
about 70% of expenditure allocated by ERDF was assigned to Objective 
1 regions. This attains 81% for the period 2000-2006 (table 3). This 
territorial imbalance in financial resources allocated by ERDF would 
confirm that most part of the strategy pursued by Cohesion policy in 
Italy aim at reducing the gap in terms of Infrastructure between North 
and South14. A similar territorial unbalance is also evident with regards 
planned expenditure in support to Agriculture and Fishing over the 
whole period 1994-2004. On the contrary, Objective 1 keeps  around 
66% of planned expenditure in support to education and employment 
allocated by ESF for the period 1994-1999 but only 40% of total 
resources during the current Community Support Framework. Under the 
Planned Period 2000-2006, ESF is mainly addressed to finance initiatives 
in Objective 3 but among Southern regions only Abruzzo has been 
eligible for Objective 3.  
Finally, as we have already disclosed in previous sections, the 
implementation of Cohesion policy in Italy has been greatly characterised 
(and limited) by a chronic delay in the expenditure. Among the others, 
the main responsibility has been assigned to the inefficient Bureaucracy 
prevailing in the South. Here, we are not interested in emphasising a well 
known handicap of Southern administrations but rather to indirectly 
assess the effects of such inefficiency. Tables 4 and 5 present a sketch of 
planned and implemented expenditure carried out over the two more 
recent Planning Periods. As regards CSF 1994-99, consistent payments 
start only after 1997. In 2001, on average, payments cover 90% of 
planned expenditure but Structural Funds greatly differ in their 
implementation performance. The more significant signal comes from 
Objective 1 where payments allocated by ERDF and ESF amount to 
40% of their total expenditure. On the contrary, support to agriculture 
has managed to implement 71% of its total expenditure. The 
implementation profile by CSF 2000-2006 is certainty more encouraging: 
in 2004 payments amount to 40% of the total expenditure.  
 
 
3. Convergence across Italian regions: an up-to-date view 
 
The prime goal of cohesion policy is regional convergence of per capita 
GDP. The lack of convergence across Italian regions has often been 
interpreted as a proof of the failure of Cohesion policy in Italy. As we 
                                                 
14 And secondly to provide Business support 
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have already emphasised, most of the relevant empirical literature on this 
issue has focussed on the First Planning Period (1989-93) which 
represents the weaker intervention program in the evolution of Cohesion 
support. Moreover, the chronic delay in the expenditure that so heavily 
has characterised the performance of Structural Funds in Italy, has ended 
up postponing on time the real impact of cohesion support.  
In this section we will briefly review some theoretical issues on 
convergence. In particular, before starting to analyse the process of 
convergence in Italy we will address the following questions: (i) why 
should regions converge and (ii) how Cohesion policy should foster 
convergence? We will then apply two popular measures broadly used to 
detect convergence. 
Why should regions converge? The Economic theory provides 
(at least) three good reasons to converge (and as many to diverge!). The 
Neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956) predicts that, as long as 
economies share the same structural parameters, regions will tend to the 
same level of per capita income. In fact, due to the law of diminishing 
returns to capital, an economy with an initial lower level of capital per 
worker should be characterised by an higher marginal productivity of 
capital, higher rates of return, and therefore will grow faster. According 
to the technology gap literature (Fagerberg, 1997), poor regions can 
exploit the knowledge accumulated in richer regions to converge,  
provided that are relatively successful in adopting new technologies: the 
basic idea is that followers can imitate the inventions of the technological 
leader, “without having to reinvent the wheel” (Ederveen et others, 
2003). Finally, the new Economic geography (Krugman, 1991) shows 
that agglomeration forces can lead to different type of equilibria. If most 
regions are able to exploit their local comparative advantages, than we 
should observe a balanced regional development. If, however, the gains 
from agglomeration are very strong, substantial geographical 
concentration will prevail. It is interesting to notice that, if labour 
mobility is very high, then some regions will result scarcely populated, 
but per capita incomes would still converge. On the contrary, when 
mobility of labour is low, the theory predicts polarisation into advanced 
and depressed regions and divergence of per capita income. Tu sum up, 
if the neo-classical theory and the technological gap literature predict that 
income disparities between economies will disappear, the new economic 
geography literature typically predict both convergence and divergence 
among regions. 
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How Cohesion Policy should foster convergence? The 
Neoclassical model predicts that,  since cohesion support translates into 
a positive impact of public investment on production15, regional steady 
state level of per capita income will increase and also the rate of regional 
economic growth will rise. The technology gap perspective suggests that, 
provided that cohesion support be able to promote factors enhancing 
indigenous technological progress (for instance, high level of R&D) then 
regional productivity in poor regions will faster converge to the levels of 
more advanced regions16. Differently from these approaches, the New 
Economic Geography theory does not provide a univocal prediction in 
favour of Cohesion policy17but it rather puts on alert on the trade off 
between equity and efficiency implied by Cohesion policy. The general 
idea can be summarised as follows: Cohesion policies finance 
infrastructures which have an impact on transaction costs and therefore 
on the location decision of firms. Consequently, the long term effect of 
such regional policies may be unexpected. In particular, policies that 
finance infrastructure to reduce transaction costs on goods between 
regions lead to more agglomeration but higher growth at the national 
level, while policies that reduce agglomeration (such as transfers, 
financing of transport infrastructure inside the poor regions) may then 
also reduce efficiency and growth.  
Using the terminology introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991)18, two concepts stand out in the empirical literature: beta 
convergence and sigma convergence. There is beta convergence in a 
cross section of economies if there is a negative relation between the 
growth rate of per capita GDP and the initial level of income. Recall that 
in neo-classical model, the further an economy is below its steady state 
level, the faster it will grow. Similar economies will, therefore, eventually 
converge to the same level of income (Absolute or unconditional 
convergence). On the contrary, if the parameters of the economy differ 
across regions only conditional convergence should be observed: the 
inverse relationship between the initial level of per capita income and the 
                                                 
15 See Aschauer (1989) 
16 For empirical evidence consistent with this thesis, see Cappelen, Castellaci, 
Fagerberg and Verspagen (2001)  
17 On this issue see Martin (1998), (1999) 
18 See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1996) 
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rate of growth would hold empirically once it is accounted for difference 
in the steady states19. 
An other popular measure for convergence is called sigma 
convergence. This refers to the dispersion of per capita income across 
groups of economies and is measured by the standard deviation of log 
per capita GDP20. If the cross sectional dispersion falls over time, we can 
conclude that there is sigma convergence for the economies in the 
sample. Hence, it does not matter whether a single economy converges 
towards to a steady state, but rather how the entire cross-section of 
economies behaves. Comparing both concepts, beta convergence studies 
the mobility of income within a distribution, whereas sigma convergence 
studies how the distribution itself evolves21.  
Several studies have assessed the convergence hypothesis across 
Italian regions. Their empirical results approximately cover the period 
1950-1990. Evidence of the persistent dualism between the North and 
the South of the country has been found in Mauro and Podrecca (1994) 
over the period 1963-89. Paci and Saba (1998) point out that the process 
of global convergence occurs only in the first half of the 1970s, 
following the period of highest policy intervention in favour of Southern 
regions. Cellini and Scorcu (1995) observe that only conditional beta 
convergence would have occurred in the 1970s across southern regions, 
but not across centre or northern regions22. Finally, According to Paci 
and Pigliaru (1997), this convergence process was mainly driven by a 
structural change in the form of sectoral shifts of the labour force from 
agriculture to industry, which would have taken place in the 1970s in the 
southern regions, rather than diminishing returns to capital23.  
Below empirical evidence is presented about beta and sigma 
convergence across Italian regions over the period 1980-2004. Figure 2 
shows the standard deviation of log per capita GDP within all Italian 
regions and within Northern and Southern regions. We observe that the 
dispersion has increased firstly until to 1992 and secondly until to 1996 
(from 0.26 to 0.28). In the same years we observe a reduction in 
                                                 
19 In both cases, the neo-classical model predicts a negative coefficient for the 
beta coefficient which also measures the annual speed of convergence.  
20 or by the coefficient of variation of per capita GDP 
21 We can observe beta convergence without sigma convergence while beta 
convergence is a necessary condition for sigma convergence.  
22 See also Di Liberto (1994) among others 
23 For a recent interpretation of these results, see also Ciriaci (2001) and Morana 
(2004) among others 
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dispersion within Northern regions (from 0.15 to 0.11). It is worthwhile 
to recall that the first Planning Period of Cohesion Policies starts in 
1989: not only we do not observe any reduction in dispersion from this 
period onwards but disparities within Southern regions, to which 
European support was mainly addressed, seem to increase. We can 
roughly anticipate that, even if the First Planning Period had been 
effective, not all the regions involved have been equally able to efficiently 
employ the financial resources. Since 1997 the dispersion declines (from 
0.28 to 0.25). This trend is confirmed for both geographical sub-groups 
which exhibit similar values. Hence, the evolution in the dispersion of 
per capita income suggests that there has been a tendency towards 
reducing disparities across the Italian regions over the period 1996-2004. 
Moreover, this tendency seems to be mainly due to a reduction within 
geographical groups than between them. Again it should be emphasised 
that this period roughly coincides with the implementation of Second 
and Third Planning Period of Cohesion Policy. 
To explore beta convergence, figure 3 shows the relationship 
between the log level of per regional capita GDP in 1980 and its growth 
rate between 1980 and 2004. We can observe a certain pattern of 
catching up. To illustrate, Calabria is the fastest growing region and 
featured among the lowest levels of per capita GDP in 1980. Valle 
d’Aosta is among the richest regions in 198024 and shows the slower 
growth rate. Further information comes from the resulting cross section 
regression. Results (as reported in table 5) show that the coefficient of 
initial level of per capita GDP turns out to be negative but not 
significant when the overall period is considered. To control for 
geographical differences across groups of regions we include a dummy 
variable, South, which takes value 1 for the eight Southern regions and 
tests the well known dualistic feature of the Italian development. The 
results show that dummy South is significant and negative for the entire 
period 1980-2004. Moreover, following the inclusion of dummy South, 
the coefficient of initial level of per capita GDP turns out to be negative 
and significant (at 1% level)25, signalling that, together with a process of 
global convergence, the Southern regions have also converged toward a 
locally steady state over the period 1980-2004. We then split the whole 
period according to the Second and Third Planning Period. Results are 
                                                 
24 Several empirical studies do not include Valle d’Aosta in the analysis due to its 
scarce population density 
25 The resulting speed of convergence is 1,5% per year 
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consistent with those obtained for sigma convergence. No tendency of 
convergence characterises the period 1980-94. Neither after the inclusion 
of dummy South the coefficient of the initial per capita GDP becomes 
significant. On the contrary, the beta coefficient26 turns out to be 
negative and significant (at 1% level) for the period 1994-2004; in this 
latter case, the corresponding speed of convergence increases from 1% 
per year to 2,4% per year when we control for differences in Steady 
states among geographical groups.  
By introducing the dummy South in the cross section analysis of 
convergence, we are implicitly assuming that Southern regions  converge 
to a common Steady state (but different from Northern regions). 
Instead, a panel estimation procedure with fixed effect would allow us to 
control for all regional differences in the Steady states. In order to check 
how the above result is robust to a panel estimation procedure, we have 
also performed a beta convergence analysis for panel data. The results 
(as reported in table 6 for period 1994-2004) are perfectly consistent with 
cross sectional results; besides, now the annual rate of convergence is 
not only negative and significant but also considerably higher (12%) than 
in the case where fixed effects were ruled out. Summing up, the above 
analysis has detected a catching up process across Italian regions over the 
period 1994-2004: the initially poorer regions tend to grow faster than 
richer regions. The crucial question is: what is the contribution of 
cohesion policy to this process of convergence? The next chapter 
addresses this question. 
 
 
4. The impact of  Structural Funds on regional Convergence 
 
The previous analysis has shown that regional convergence in Italy has 
occurred after the implementation of the second reform of the Structural 
Funds in 199427. But, can the observed convergence across Italian 
regions be attributed to the effectiveness of the expenditure by Structural 
Funds? Before starting with the econometric analysis, some comments 
follow about the Planning Periods and data considered. Since we are 
primarily interested in assessing the effective role of the expenditure in 
Structural Funds and provided that data on payments carried out during 
the period 1989-93 are not currently available, in this version we prefer 
                                                 
26 The  rate of convergence is 1% per year.  
27 See European Commission (2004) 
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to narrow the analysis to expenditure associated with the Second and 
Third Planning Period and consequently we will focus on years 1994-
2004; if on one hand this approach to the effectiveness of the Structural 
Funds can be seen as biased or incomplete, on the other hand, some 
aspects related with the performance of the First Planning Period can 
help to legitimise this choice. The First Planning Period has been largely 
considered as a failure on the ground that regions were unable, firstly, to 
submit relevant projects and secondly, to spend the amount received. 
The inefficiency of Public Administration and the chronic delay in the 
expenditure are well documented facts of the Italian performance in the 
access of Structural Funds. According to official documents very little of 
the planned expenditure under the Community Support Framework 
1989-93 has been really spent during the period 1989-93. As we have 
said, this (negative) experience has (at least) played an important role to 
spur the more recent reform of Structural Funds (1994). Therefore, by 
considering only the more recent Planning Periods and the expenditure 
associated with them, we are also implicitly testing the effectiveness of 
such reform. 
In what follows we will use data28 on annual payments relative to 
Public Contribution29 and distinguished according to the pertaining 
Fund, as provided by the Italian Authority for monitoring (IGRUE). It is 
worthwhile to recall that such data do not include expenditure from 
National Operative Programs (NOPs) but only data immediately 
attributable to regions. Moreover, while data on annual payments are 
easily available for Planning Period 2000-2006, only data covering period 
1999-2001 are available by year, by fund and by region for Planning 
Period 1994-99. We have thus obtained the payments for missing years 
by crossing information published in the various Annual Reports30. 
Finally, as we have already highlighted in the descriptive analysis, we are 
here mainly interested in assessing the impact of the amount of financial 
resources accruing by Structural Funds, no matter under which 
Community Support Framework they are implemented. Thus, the aim is 
not to provide a judgement about which Planning Period has been more 
efficient in its realisation but rather an assessment of the strategy realised 
by each Fund. Accordingly to this approach, in our analysis,  payments 
                                                 
28 The same data have been used in the descriptive analysis 
29 Only Private Contribution is excluded 
30 Information are taken from DPS (2004), DPS (2005) and Fadda, Montemurro 
(2004) 
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per fund at the regional level, in years for which the implementation of 
the two CSF overlap are given by the sum of the corresponding 
payments.   
Since the Cohesion Policy has been mainly criticised on the 
ground that a considerable amount of financial resources have been 
inefficiently devoted to regional support, we first consider the impact of 
the total expenditure in Structural Funds on convergence. We regress the 
regional growth during the period 1994-2004 on the initial per capita 
GDP and on the amount of Total Regional Funds. In order to control 
for size differences between regions, the total expenditure by Structural 
Funds is measured as share of average regional GDP. In general, a 
positive and significant coefficient for Structural Funds will be 
interpreted as evidence of positive effect on economic growth; if the 
inclusion of variables representing Cohesion support significantly alters 
the coefficient of the initial level of per capita GDP, than, we will also 
conclude that Structural Funds play a role in enhancing regional 
convergence. We also introduce the employment rate in agriculture to 
control for the productive structure of the regional economy. As we 
discuss in section 1, Southern regions are still characterised by a larger 
primary sector than Northern ones. Table 8 shows results from Panel 
data estimates with fixed effects in order to control for Region-specific 
Steady states. The impact of the total Structural Funds appears to be 
highly positive and significant (at the 1% level). The initial level of per 
capita GDP is negative and significant at the 1% level and it also implies 
an higher annual rate of convergence (about 16%). The introduction of 
the employment rate in agriculture (which exhibits the expected negative 
sign) does not substantially alter these results31. We should bear in mind 
that, since the period of our analysis is relatively short, our estimate may 
capture only a part of the economic impact of the structural 
programmes. In fact, most programmes and related measures are of long 
term nature and produce their full effect on the economy only after a 
larger number of years. In order to check for long period impact, we 
follow the experiment performed by Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) 
and estimate the impact of the expenditure lagged up to three periods 
with respect to regional growth. As a result we observe that, in our 
estimates the impact of total Structural Funds disappears after two years 
following the initial investment. As we have strongly emphasised in 
previous sections, the four Structural Funds differ both regards the 
                                                 
31 In general it yields to an higher speed of convergence per year 
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intervention context and the strategy pursued. In what follows we will 
consider the impact of the total expenditure disaggregated by Structural 
Funds. The panel estimates are reported in table 9. While the initial level 
of per capita GDP always keeps a strongly negative and significant 
coefficient, the picture emerging from the regional support is mixed. The 
European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) shows a positive and 
significant (at the 5% level) impact on the regional growth. According to 
our raw identification between Funds and intervention strategy, this 
could be interpreted as an encouraging result of a positive performance 
of expenditure in Infrastructure. On the same way but in the opposite 
direction, we could conclude that expenditure aimed to enhance human 
capital and employment by European Social Fund (ESF) has been quite 
ineffective in enhancing regional convergence: it exhibits a negative and 
never significant coefficient. Given the negligible amount of the 
initiatives devoted to modernise Fishing sector, we are not surprise to 
observe that the coefficient of Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG) is never significant. On the contrary, the results 
obtained for the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) deserve a closer analysis. In our estimates the support to 
Agriculture shows a positive and significant impact on regional growth 
(but only when we control for the employment rate in agriculture). In 
most of the empirical studies on the European Structural Funds the 
positive impact detected for EAGGF has been generally interpreted as a 
confirmation that Cohesion Policy has been working as a pure 
redistributive policy rather than an instrument able to trigger regional 
growth. Our results are in line with this view. When we test for long 
period effects, apart from the initial level of per capita GDP which keeps 
a negative and significant coefficient, only the coefficient of ERDF is 
still positive and significant (at the 5% level) after three years. On the 
contrary, the positive impact of EAGGF seems to be already vanished 
after two years: a negative and not significant coefficient represents a 
further confirmation that European policies in favour of Agriculture 
sector translate into an (immediate and short term) income support 
rather than a (long term) sustainable development policy.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Despite the multiplication of financial resources devoted to regional 
development policies and following the reform of the Structural Funds 
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in 1989, there is no clear evidence of greater economic and social 
cohesion and convergence across regions in the EU. In particular, the 
lack of convergence across Italian regions has been widely quoted as an 
incontrovertible proof of failure by Cohesion policy. In this work we try 
to contribute to the actual debate on the effectiveness of Cohesion 
policy on two grounds. Firstly, we have updated the empirical literature 
on convergence across Italian regions by focussing on the period 
covered by regional development policies carried out by European 
Community. The analysis reveals that, poorer regions in Italy have 
indeed caught up with the richer regions over period 1994-2004 and 
much of this convergence process has occurred towards region-specific 
steady states. In order to assess whether Cohesion Policy has had an 
impact on regional convergence in Italy, we have considered Structural 
Funds as a conditioning variable in the convergence equation by running 
a regression model in which regional growth during the period 1994-
2004 is regressed on the initial level of per capita GDP and on the 
amount of payments implemented by Structural Funds. Our panel 
estimates point to a positive and significant impact of the Structural 
Funds on regional convergence in Italy over the period 1994-2004. If the 
Structural Funds are considered individually we find that the expenditure 
allocated by ERDF has medium term positive and significant returns. 
According to our raw identification between Funds and intervention 
context, this result may be interpreted as a success of Investment in 
Infrastructure (and to a less extent, Small Business Support) in filling the 
gap between Northern and Southern regions. Support to agriculture has 
short-term positive effects on growth which wane quickly. This result is 
somehow consistent with part of the empirical literature reporting only a 
redistributive role for EU Regional policies. On the contrary there is no 
evidence in favour of a positive impact on regional convergence by 
Funds mainly devoted to support to Human Capital and employment (by 
ESF). On the whole our findings are in line with most recent empirical 
studies and agree upon a (slightly) more optimistic view of the impact of 
Cohesion Policy: even if Structural Funds are likely to produce their full 
effects on the economy only after a larger number of years, we can 
already detect a significant effect in narrowing the gap in per capita GDP 
between Italian regions. Nevertheless, our work confirms the high risk 
for Regional development policy to wear out in a mere redistributive 
policy to support income, rather than fully exploit the potential as 
intervention policy able to trigger long term growth. Finally, our results 
cast some doubt both on the (i) distributive efficiency of resources 
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allocated by ESF and (ii) on the effectiveness of the intervention policies 
in support to education, Human capital and employment.  
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Fig. 1. Distributive Efficiency of Structural Funds across Italian Regions, 1994-2004 
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Fig. 2. Sigma Convergence within Italian Regions, 1980-2004 
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Fig.3. Beta Convergence across Italian Regions, 1980-2004 
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Tab.1. Economic and Social Indicators for Italian Regions 
 
  % Employed by Sector  Unemployment Rate (%)  Level of Education (*) 
 
%GDP 
ann.Gr. 
Per capita 
GDP 
(EU15=100) 
 
Agr. Industry Service 
 
Total 
Long 
Period 
Female Young 
 
Low Medium High 
 95-01 1996 2001  2002  2002  2002 
                 
PIE 1.3 117 115  3.4 38.1 58.5  5.1 47.5 7.3 15.5  57.6 33.0 9.4 
VDA 0.6 131 124  3.4 38.1 58.5  3.6 19.3 5.5 10.6  58.6 33.8 7.6 
LOM 1.9 132 131  1.9 40.1 58.0  3.8 36.5 5.6 11.4  53.7 35.7 10.6 
TAA 2.4 128 133  7.8 27.3 64.9  2.6 11.7 3.8 5.0  52.4 38.5 9.1 
VEN 1.9 124 116  4.0 40.2 55.8  3.4 28.6 5.2 7.6  57.4 33.9 8.7 
FVG 1.4 126 112  3.1 33.5 63.4  3.7 25.8 5.6 9.4  51.3 39.0 9.7 
LIG 2.1 119 108  3.7 22.7 73.6  6.3 57.4 8.6 23.0  53.4 35.5 11.1 
EMR 1.9 133 126  5.4 35.6 59.0  3.3 25.5 4.6 9.0  51.9 36.6 11.5 
TOS 2.2 111 111  3.9 33.0 63.1  4.8 38.8 7.3 16.2  56.5 33.3 10.2 
UMB 2.0 98 98  4.6 33.0 62.4  5.7 44.9 8.9 16.5  48.1 40.4 11.5 
MAR 2.2 106 101  4.0 40.7 55.3  4.4 33.8 6.4 10.5  55.1 34.1 10.8 
LAZ 1.8 114 111  3.3 19.9 76.8  8.6 68.7 11.9 32.0  48.3 38.9 12.8 
ABR 1.6 90 84  5.8 31.6 62.6  6.2 54.1 10.0 20.1  52.2 36.9 10.9 
MOL 2.2 79 78  10.0 29.1 60.9  12.6 61.0 18.7 34.3  54.4 35.2 10.4 
CAM 2.3 66 65  6.4 24.4 69.2  21.1 73.7 30.6 59.5  59.8 31.0 9.2 
PUG 1.9 71 65  10.3 26.9 62.8  14.0 65.8 20.6 37.8  62.1 28.8 9.1 
BAS 2.1 69 70  10.4 33.2 56.4  15.3 60.3 23.8 43.4  58.6 33.3 8.1 
CAL 2.2 59 62  12.4 19.9 67.7  24.6 62.2 35.6 58.2  58.2 32.2 9.6 
SIC 2.1 66 65  9.3 20.4 70.3  20.1 69.3 28.4 51.2  61.7 29.2 9.1 
SAR 2.2 75 76  8.7 23.5 67.8  18.5 58.5 26.4 48.3  62.8 29.0 8.2 
                 
Source: Eurostat:; (*) Level of Education for people of age between 25-64 year (% over the Total)  
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Tab.2. Allocation of Structural Funds, 1994-99 
 
 
 ERDF ESF EAGGF FIFG 
 Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual 
Ob.1 70% 54% 66% 51% 49% 44% 62% 0% 
Ob.2 11% 17% 11% 13%     
Ob.3 9% 15%       
Ob.4   16% 26%     
Ob.5A     26% 32% 33% 0% 
Ob.5B 9% 12% 5% 8% 21% 22%   
LEADER II 0% 2% 2% 1% 4% 3%   
RECHAR II 0% 0%       
FIFG not Ob.1       5% 100% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
100% 67% 62% 12% 11% 19% 27% 2% 0% 
Source: Monit IGRUE 
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Tab.3. Allocation of Structural Funds, 2000-06 
 
 
 ERDF ESF EAGGF FIFG 
 Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual 
Ob.1 81% 81% 39% 33% 92% 92% 71% 66% 
Ob.2 19% 18%       
Ob.3   56% 65%     
Innovative Actions 0% 0%       
EQUAL   5% 2%     
LEADER +     8% 8%   
URBAN 1% 1%       
FIFG not Ob.1       29% 34% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
100% 62% 60% 27% 30% 9% 8% 1% 1% 
Source: Monit IGRUE 
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Tab.4. Planned and Implemented Financial Plan, 1994-99 
 
Payments per Year (% over the Total) 
Objective 
Structural 
Funds 
Total 
Cost 
% SF on  
TC 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Cumulated 
Payments 
Ob. 1  31851  2% 6% 11% 16% 14% 11% 12% 31% 103% 
 ERDF 23007 72% 1% 2% 4% 6% 6% 4% 5% 12% 40% 
 ESF 3785 12% 1% 3% 5% 7% 6% 5% 5% 6% 38% 
 EAGGF 4449 14% 1% 5% 8% 12% 11% 9% 9% 15% 71% 
 FIFG 611 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ob. 2  4352  0% 1% 9% 10% 20% 13% 18% 17% 89% 
 ERDF 3693 85% 0% 0% 3% 3% 19% 12% 17% 21% 76% 
 ESF 659 15% 0% 0% 3% 4% 17% 11% 15% 7% 57% 
Ob. 3 ERDF 3047 100% 3% 7% 10% 16% 15% 15% 13% 5% 83% 
Ob. 4 ESF 921 100% 0% 3% 9% 13% 14% 15% 15% 13% 81% 
Ob. 5A  2704  3% 3% 5% 8% 17% 18% 16% 14% 85% 
 EAGGF 2382 88% 3% 4% 6% 9% 19% 21% 18% 16% 96% 
 FIFG 322 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ob. 5B  5174  0% 1% 3% 9% 14% 24% 17% 14% 83% 
 ERDF 3003 58% 0% 1% 3% 7% 11% 19% 14% 11% 66% 
 ESF 286 6% 0% 1% 3% 9% 13% 22% 16% 13% 78% 
 EAGGF 1885 36% 0% 1% 4% 10% 15% 24% 18% 14% 85% 
LEADER II  874  0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 8% 11% 31% 57% 
 ERDF 438 50% 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 9% 12% 33% 62% 
 ESF 89 10% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 7% 9% 23% 45% 
 EAGGF 347 40% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 8% 10% 30% 53% 
FIFG FIFG 50 100% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 6% 8% 15% 31% 
Tot 94-99  52451  1% 4% 9% 13% 14% 14% 14% 24% 94% 
Source: MONIT IGRUE, Rapporto Annuale DPS, 2003, 2004 
Values are in thousands of Euro. Data include National Operative Programs 
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Tab.5. Planned and Implemented Financial Plan, 2000-2006 
 
 
Payments per Year 
Objective 
Structural 
Funds 
Total 
Cost 
% Public 
Cost 
% SF on 
P.C. 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Cumulated 
Payments 
Ob.1  41445 99%   2% 5% 9% 11% 9% 37% 
 ERDF  29538 99% 72% 1% 3% 6% 9% 10% 9% 37% 
 ESF   6130 99% 15% 0% 1% 3% 6% 14% 13% 37% 
 EAGGF 5057 99% 12% 0% 1% 2% 12% 11% 8% 34% 
 FIFG  720 75% 1% 0% 0% 5% 10% 7% 17% 39% 
Ob.2 ERDF  8319 81% 100% 0% 0% 1% 3% 14% 18% 36% 
Ob.3 ESF   8774 99% 100% 0% 0% 4% 11% 16% 17% 50% 
Others:  2228 81%  0% 0% 0% 4% 12% 8% 23% 
I.A. ERDF  115 83% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 40% 49% 
EQUAL ESF   789 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 4% 17% 
LEADER  EAGGF 682 67% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 26% 34% 
URBAN ERDF  264 93% 100% 0% 0% 2% 6% 14% 12% 34% 
FIFG FIFG  378 59% 100% 0% 0% 0% 22% 12% 14% 48% 
Tot 00-6  60766 96%  0% 2% 4% 9% 12% 8% 34% 
Source: MONIT IGRUE; Rapporto Annuale DPS, 2003, 2004 
Values are in thousands of Euro. Data include National Operative Programs 
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Tab.6. Absolute Beta Convergence: a Cross Section Analysis  
 
Dependent variable: Annual Average Growth rate of per capita GDP (constant 1995) 
Estimation method: OLS 
Period: 1980-2004 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
Constant 0.05 
(2.07) 
0.16 
(4.50) 
Log level of per 
capita GDP in 1980 
-0.003 
(-1.36) 
-0.015 
(-4.05)1% 
Dummy South  -0.007 
(-3.66) 1% 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.43 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
1.84 
(0.19) 
8.25 
(0.00) 
   
Period: 1980-1994 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
Constant 0.01 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(1.82) 
Log level of per 
capita GDP in 1980 
0.002 
(0.79) 
-0.009 
(-1.51) 
Dummy South  -0.01 
(-2.22) 5% 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.16 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
0.61 
(0.44) 
2.83 
(0.08) 
   
Period: 1994-2004 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
Constant 0.11 
(4.46) 
0.25 
(5.35) 
Log level of per 
capita GDP in 1994 
-0.01 
(-3.85) 1% 
-0.024 
(-5.06) 1% 
Dummy South  -0.01 
(-3.30) 1% 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.62 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
14.82 
(0.00) 
16.92 
(0.00) 
 
 
 32 
Tab.7. Absolute Beta Convergence: a Panel Data Analysis 
 
Dependent variable: An. Average Growth rate of per capita GDP (constant prices 1995) 
Estimation methods: LSDV (2), GLS (3) 
Period: 1994-2004, annual panel 
Observations: 200 
Groups: 20 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 (1) 
Between Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
    
Constant 0.11 
(3.92) 
1.18 
(5.72) 
0.15 
(3.48) 
Log level of initial 
per capita GDP  
-0.009 
(-3.37) 1% 
-0.12 
(-5.65) 1% 
-0.14 
(-3.14) 1% 
    
R-squared:    
Within 0.1511 0.1511 0.1511 
Between 0.3868 0.3868 0.3868 
Overall 0.0474 0.0474 0.0474 
    
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
11.36 
(0.00) 
31.87 
(0.00) 
 
Wald chi  squared  
Prob (Wald chi) 
  9.84 
(0.00) 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
 1.74 
(0.033) 
 
Hausman test   25.96 
(0.00) 
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Tab. 8. The impact of Total Structural Funds on Regional convergence: Italy, 1994-2004 
 
Dependent variable: Annual Average Growth rate of per capita GDP (constant prices 1995) 
Estimation methods: LSDV 
Period: 1994-2004, annual panel 
Observations: 200 
Groups: 20 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
One Lag 
(4) 
Two Lags 
(5) 
Three Lags 
      
Constant 1.59 
(7.67) 
2.44 
(6.59) 
2.39 
(6.12) 
2.31 
(5.93) 
2.21 
(5.61) 
Log level of initial per 
capita GDP 
-0.16 
(-7.62) 1% 
-0.25 
(-6.68) 1% 
-0.24 
(-6.19) 1% 
-0.24 
(-6.02) 1% 
-0.22 
(-5.66) 1% 
Total Structural Funds 
over average GDP 
1.11 
(5.28) 1% 
1.07 
(5.17) 1% 
0.64 
(3.08) 1% 
0.64 
(2.64) 5% 
0.32 
(1.17) 
Employment rate in 
Agriculture 
 -0.52 
(-2.77) 5% 
-0.44 
(-2.16) 5% 
-0.28 
(-1.24) 
-0.40 
(-1.57) 
      
R-squared:       
Within 0.2662 0.2966 0.2318 0.2212 0.1968 
Between 0.3827 0.3990 0.3997 0.3985 0.3972 
Overall 0.0511 0.0522 0.0455 0.0431 0.0439 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
32.29 
(0.00) 
24.88 
(0.00) 
17.81 
(0.00) 
16.76 
(0.00) 
14.46 
(0.00) 
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Tab. 9. The impact of Individual Structural Funds on Regional convergence: Italy, 1994-2004 
 
Dependent variable: Annual Average Growth rate of per capita GDP (constant prices 1995) 
Estimation methods: LSDV 
Period: 1994-2004, annual panel; Observations: 200;  Groups: 20; t-statistics in parenthesis 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
One Lag 
(4) 
Two Lags 
(5) 
Three Lags 
Constant 1.48 
(5.39) 
2.30 
(5.93) 
2.31 
(5.79) 
2.37 
(6.01) 
2.46 
(6.13) 
Log level of initial per 
capita GDP 
-0.15 
(-5.34) 1% 
-0.23 
(-5.96) 1% 
-0.23 
(-5.82) 1% 
-0.24 
(-6.09) 1% 
-0.25 
(-6.19) 1% 
ERDF over average GDP 1.19 
(2.75) 5% 
0.94 
(2.17) 5% 
0.16 
(0.36) 
1.46 
(2.42) 5% 
2.20 
(2.87) 5% 
ESF over average GDP -0.27 
(-0.24) 
-0.76 
(-0.69) 
-0.83 
(-0.64) 
-0.44 
(-0.24) 
-1.49 
(-0.61) 
EAGGF over average 
GDP 
1.17 
(1.47) 
1.59 
(2.01) 5% 
1.90 
(2.24) 5% 
-0.30 
(-0.26) 
-1.82 
(-1.31) 
FIFG over average GDP  18.1 
(0.82) 
9.64 
(0.44) 
38.9 
(0.57) 
-26.2 
(-1.60) 
-51.8 
(-1.67) 
Employment rate in 
Agriculture 
 -0.57 
(-2.93) 5% 
-0.5 
(-2.35) 5% 
-0.30 
(-1.28) 
-0.4 
(-1.56) 
R-squared:       
Within 0.2745 0.3086 0.2457 0.2355 0.2278 
Between 0.3823 0.3979 0.4005 0.3957 0.3866 
Overall 0.0547 0.0580 0.0497 0.0438 0.0430 
F-statistics 
Prob (F-statistic) 
13.24 
(0.00) 
12.95 
(0.00) 
9.44 
(0.00) 
8.93 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00) 
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Appendix  
 
1994-1999 2000-2006 
Code Geo 
Ob.1 Ob.2 Ob.3 Ob.4 Ob.5A Ob.5B Leader Rechar Ob.1 Ob.2 Ob.3 Leader A.I. 
PIE N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
VDA N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
LOM N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
TAA (*) N   (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)   (*) (*) (*) (*) 
VEN N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
FVG N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
LIG N  x x x x x x   x x x  
EMR N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
TOS N  x x x x x x x  x x x x 
UMB N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
MAR N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
LAZ N  x x x x x x   x x x x 
ABR S x  x x x  x   x x x x 
MOL S x      x  x   x x 
CAM S x      x  x   x x 
PUG S x      x  x   x x 
BAS S x      x  x   x x 
CAL S x      x  x   x x 
SIC S x      x  x   x x 
SAR S x      x x x   x x 
ERDF  + + +   + + + + +   + 
ESF  + +  +  + +   +  +    
EAGGF  +    + + +   +   +   
FIFG  +       +       +         
(*) Original data are for Bolzano and Trento 
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